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ABSTRACT
When conservatives in the 1980s offered originalism as a constitutional methodology that could
limit perceived judicial excesses, they touted its ability to constrain judges to follow the
Constitution’s fixed, original meaning. Though originalism has changed many times since, its
proponents still generally preach these related virtues of fixation and constraint. This symposium
contribution reviews recent scholarly developments in originalism and contends that originalism’s
capacity to fix constitutional meaning and constrain judicial decision making is overstated in
both practice and theory.
In practice, originalism’s many variants provide the ostensibly originalist justice great interpretive
flexibility. Originalist justices are methodologically inconsistent, offering an array of arguments
rooted in original intentions, understandings, expected applications, and public meanings. The
justices also disagree on when originalism should guide outcomes, further adding to its
malleability.
In theory, the new originalism, which focuses on the text’s original public meaning, corrects some
of these problems. Nevertheless, it too often falls short of its promises to deliver fixation and constraint. While fixation is possible in some instances, the history and semantic practices surrounding many disputed clauses are too muddled for the interpreter to identify a single, original public
meaning. Moreover, many constitutional provisions were framed and ratified during periods of
profound intellectual flux, when key constitutional concepts and terms changed shape rapidly.
Indeed, the very process of constitution making may have added further indeterminacy, as many
members of the Founding and Reconstruction generations understood constitutional language not
to provide precise legal guidance but rather open-ended political compromise. As for constraint,
many new originalists intelligently concede that their theory constrains only insofar as constitutional construction must not violate the text’s original public meaning. However, by requiring
such fidelity to the constitutional text, the new originalists, far from cabining judicial discretion,
invite justices to revisit settled constitutional precedent. To be fair, other interpretive approaches
similarly fail to constrain justices, but originalism’s pretense that it captures the Constitution’s
singular, objective meaning creates an especially misleading illusion of certainty.
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INTRODUCTION
When prominent conservatives like Judge Robert Bork and Edwin
Meese offered originalism in the 1970s and 1980s as a method of
constitutional interpretation that could limit the perceived excesses
1
of the Warren and Burger Courts, they touted its ability to constrain
2
judges to follow the Constitution’s fixed, original meaning. Though
originalism has changed many times since then, its proponents gen3
erally preach these related virtues of “fixation” and “constraint.” Indeed, even the “new originalism,” which focuses on the original public meaning of the text, as opposed to the subjective intentions of the
4
ratifiers or Framers, often emphasizes these merits.
Because
originalism fixes a constitutional provision’s meaning at the moment
of its framing or ratification, new originalists argue, judges are con5
strained from supplanting the real Constitution with their own values.

1

2

3

4

5

See Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70, 72 (Grant Huscroft &
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (arguing that when originalist arguments were developed in
the 1970s and 1980s, they were “aimed at correcting what critics thought had gone wrong
in American constitutional jurisprudence in the postwar period”).
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
159 (1990) (“The interpretation of the Constitution according to the original understanding . . . is the only method that can preserve the Constitution, the separation of
powers, and the liberties of the people.”); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United
States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (arguing that
judicial review is legitimate only when confined to a “jurisprudence of original intention”
(emphasis omitted)).
See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1343, 1372 (2009) (“The core of originalism is the proposition that text and history
impose meaningful, binding constraints on interpretive discretion . . . .”); Lawrence B.
Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 12, 36 (“Most originalists agree that courts
should view themselves as constrained by original meaning . . . .”).
See Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1, 4 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) (arguing that the fixation thesis and textual constraint thesis “are accepted by almost every originalist thinker”).
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 156 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) and JACK
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)) (“The fixation thesis and the constraint principle
constitute the core of contemporary originalist thought.”). Of course, originalism is also
concerned with other facets of constitutional interpretation beyond judges’ work. See,
e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 17, 279 (2011) (arguing that originalism should
also involve interpretations by citizens, executive officials, and members of legislatures).
However, because judges in our system ultimately resolve many of our most contentious
constitutional disputes, this Article limits its discussion of originalism to judicial decision
making.
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Originalism has genuine virtue in turning our attention to history
and text, and new originalist scholars have developed their theory in
6
a rich and fascinating body of scholarship. Whatever its merits,
though, originalism often cannot fulfill its promises of fixation and
constraint. Whether fixation and constraint are worthy goals is debatable, of course, but the point here is that originalism, both new
and old, fails to attain either. Indeed, the diversity of originalist theories renders originalism very malleable. To be fair, other interpretive approaches similarly fail to constrain the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision making, but originalism’s pretense that it is
different creates an especially misleading illusion of certainty.
This Article reviews recent developments in originalism scholarship with particular attention to the new originalism and its ambitions
7
of fixation and constraint. Part I briefly rehearses problems with
originalism generally, as it is practiced, arguing that originalism’s
malleability undermines its capacity to fix “correct” constitutional
meaning and constrain judicial choices. Because justices disagree
about how and when to engage in originalist interpretation, we
should be skeptical that originalism in practice limits judicial decision
making any better than other approaches to constitutional decision
making. Part II turns to originalism in theory, focusing on the new
originalism. This Part contends that notwithstanding the new
originalism’s great theoretical sophistication, it too will often fail to
fix an objective constitutional meaning that meaningfully constrains
judges in most litigation. While fixation is possible in some instances,
the history and semantic practices surrounding many disputed clauses are too muddled for the interpreter to identify an objective, original public meaning. Moreover, many constitutional provisions were
framed and ratified during periods of profound intellectual flux,
when key constitutional concepts and terms changed shape, thus
making it difficult or impossible to locate a single semantic meaning.
As for constraint, many new originalists intelligently concede that
6

7

I use the term “originalism” to refer generally and collectively to the various strains of the
theory. When discussing a single variant of originalism, I specify the particular strand at
issue.
Due to obvious space limitations, this Article cannot address all relevant issues here and,
instead, focuses on the problems of constraint and fixation. There is a vast literature offering broader critiques of originalism, both old, see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985), and new, see, e.g.,
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Thomas B. Colby,
The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J.
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).
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their theory constrains only insofar as constitutional construction
must not violate the Constitution’s original public meaning. However, by requiring such fidelity to the constitutional text, the new
originalists, far from cabining judicial discretion, invite judges to revisit seemingly settled constitutional precedent.
The new
originalism’s contributions to our scholarly discourse are considerable, but, like the old originalism, its capacity to accurately fix constitutional meaning and constrain judicial decision making is overstated.
I. ORIGINALISM’S MALLEABILITY
A. Originalism’s Variants
Originalism, in practice, fails to fix an objectively correct constitutional meaning that constrains judges in large part because there is
8
disagreement about what originalist interpretation entails. These
variations yield interesting discussions among legal academics, who
can debate the relative merits of different approaches. Judges, however, are typically less immersed in the academic literature and are
often less theoretically self-conscious about which version of
originalism they are applying. As a result, ostensibly originalist judges
approach the theory eclectically, drawing on useful historical or textual evidence to support a desired conclusion. Such eclecticism,
whether among or within theories of interpretation, is not necessarily
bad. Most judges approach constitutional interpretation with a range
9
of interpretive approaches. But, theoretical eclecticism also gives
judges leeway to find the approach that best supports a preferred
10
outcome.

8

9

10

See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 244 (“A review of originalist’ work reveals
originalism to be not a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation,
but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in common
except a misleading reliance on a single label.”).
See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (employing numerous
kinds of constitutional arguments); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV.
747, 751 (1999) (enumerating the various constitutional arguments in M’Culloch); Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and “Tradition,” 39 TEX. TECH L. REV.
261, 262 (2007) (“Over more than two centuries of interpreting the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has developed a mass of tests, standards, interpretations, and
levels of scrutiny . . . .”).
See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 79,
79 (2010) (“Supreme Court Justices frequently divide on questions of original meaning,
and the divisions have a way of mapping what we might suspect are the Justices’ leanings
about the merits of cases irrespective of originalist considerations.”).
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Within the family of originalist theories, judges can consult,
among others, original intentions, original understandings, original
11
expected application, and original public meaning. These variants,
roughly speaking, share an interest in fixing constitutional meaning
based on the relevant historical and/or linguistic evidence, but each
variant asks a different question. Though scholars are not entirely
consistent when using these terms, generally speaking, originalintentions originalism focuses on the intentions of the Constitution’s
Framers (or the framers of subsequent amendments, where rele12
vant). Original-understanding originalism, by contrast, cognizant
that the Constitution acquired legal legitimacy not in Philadelphia in
13
1787, but through the ratifying conventions, looks to the under14
standings of the Constitution’s ratifiers.
Original-expectedapplications originalism, a variant of the first two, asks how Framers
or ratifiers would have expected constitutional provisions to be ap15
plied to particular issues. Public-meaning originalism differs more
sharply from the first three, focusing not on the subjective views of
16
the Framers or ratifiers, but rather on the objective semantic con17
tent of the Constitution’s text at the moment of ratification.
11

12

13

14
15

16

This list of originalism’s variants is hardly exhaustive. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Living
Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the American Constitution, 92
B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2012) (listing varieties of originalism). The list, in fact, continues to grow. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 5, at 3 (proposing a theory of “framework
originalism, which views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance that sets
politics in motion, and that Americans must fill out over time through constitutional construction”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 760
(2009) (“[T]he Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the interpretive
rules that were deemed applicable at the time.”).
See, e.g., Edwin Meese, III, Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/page/the-great-debateattorney-general-ed-meese-iii-july-9-1985 (urging attention to the “original intention of
those who framed” the Constitution).
See U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution . . . .”); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 54–55 (1998) (explaining that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention exceeded their mandate in drafting the Constitution and that Article
VII requiring nine states’ ratification violated Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, which required unanimity for any alteration to the Articles).
See Solum, supra note 5, at 12, 19.
See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296 (2007)
(“Original expected application asks how people living at the time the text was adopted
would have expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary sense (along with
any legal terms of art).”).
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 100 (2004) (explaining originalism as a “commitment to a written text”); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923,
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Of course, despite their differences, these inquiries can help inform each other and will sometimes point towards the same outcome.
For example, evidence of the Framers’ intentions for a particular
clause may help establish that the ratifiers understood the provision
to mean the same thing, especially when particular Framers made
18
their case to the people during the ratifying debates. Similarly, evidence of the Framers’ intentions or the ratifiers’ understanding of a
particular provision is a data point that can help discern the provision’s original public meaning; the Framers and ratifiers, after all,
19
presumably often relied on public meanings when they used words.
That said, intentions, understandings, meanings, and expected
applications are analytically distinct concepts, which can sometimes
point towards different outcomes. Though commentators and judges
often fail to distinguish between the Framers’ intentions and the
ratifiers’ understandings, the two can diverge. For example, several
Framers at the Constitutional Convention suggested that treaties be
self-executing (i.e., that treaties would not require statutes implementing them). Many members of the state ratifying conventions
20
apparently did not share that view. The original-intentions and original-understandings originalist, then, may approach this problem differently.
Even when original intentions, understandings, and expected applications coincide, they can diverge from original public meanings.
Justice Antonin Scalia and others have argued sometimes that both
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected the
Equal Protection Clause to protect against racial discrimination but
21
not sex discrimination. Contemporary Equal Protection Doctrine

17

18

19
20

21

933 (2009) (explaining that the core idea of public-meaning originalism is that “the original meaning of the Constitution is the original public meaning of the constitutional
text”).
See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 23 (Univ. Ill. Coll. Of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008) (arguing that the semantic content of
a constitutional provision is fixed at the time of framing and ratification); infra Part II.A.
See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 820–23 (2007) (arguing that some
“Federalist Papers expressly purport to describe the original intent of the Framers” and
that “[e]ven if the Federalist Papers did not influence the ratification debates, the ratification debates may have influenced the Federalist Papers”).
See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 464 (2013).
See Maggs, supra note 18, at 806 (arguing that evidence suggests that the Framers at the
Constitutional Convention and the participants in the state ratifying conventions disagreed on whether treaties would be self-executing).
See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan: Legacy of a Champion, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1151,
1180–81 (2013) (“Justice Scalia . . . has repeatedly stated that the Court’s gender discrim-
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clearly extends to sex discrimination, but it is certainly plausible that
neither the framers nor the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood themselves to be protecting women from sex discrimina22
tion, which was widely accepted at the time. A semantic originalist,
however, could conclude that the text’s original public meaning differed from the framers’ and ratifiers’ original expected application.
The text of the Equal Protection Clause states that “[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec23
tion of the laws.” Women are plainly “persons,” and therefore must
be afforded “equal protection of the laws” under either contemporary or 1868 linguistic conventions. One could contend that “equal
protection of the laws” is a term of art referring only to racial discrimination, so that all persons—women and men—would be protected
against race discrimination, but not sex discrimination. The more
persuasive reading, however, as Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert
conclude, is that the Fourteenth Amendment “bans all systems of
24
caste and of class-based lawmaking,” including, of course, sex discrimination. We, thus, have an instance where original expected application likely yields an opposite outcome from original public
25
meaning. Originalism’s variants, then, give the ostensibly originalist

22

23
24
25

ination doctrine is wrong as an original matter because the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly did not intend the Equal Protection Clause to protect women from
discrimination.”); Terry Eastland, Op-Ed., Proper Interpretation of the Constitution, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1986, at A23 (arguing that “a jurisprudence of original intention” would
not permit elevated scrutiny for sex-based classifications). In fairness, Justice Scalia more
recently said that “of course” the Fourteenth Amendment covers women. See Jennifer
Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 6, 2013, http://nymag.com/news/
features/antonin-scalia-2013-10.
See Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2000) (“The [Fourteenth] Amendment [during Reconstruction]
was understood not to disturb the prevailing regime of state laws imposing very substantial legal disabilities on women.”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2003)
(“[Sex discrimination law under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment] derived neither from the abstract text of the Equal Protection Clause nor from the original intent of
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1,
11 (2011).
One could also see the disparity here as a problem of levels of generality. The reasonable
observer in 1868 may have understood the Fourteenth Amendment, at a broad level of
generality, to eliminate all systems of caste and simultaneously believed, at a narrower
level of generality (admittedly paradoxically), that it said nothing about sex discrimination. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore this complication, but it is worth
noting that originalism alone cannot find neutral principles with which to determine the
level of generality. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 41 (2013)
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judge substantial leeway to justify a preferred outcome on originalist
26
grounds.
Of course, were an originalist judge truly committed to employing
originalism as a means of self-restraint, she could select a single vari27
ant and consistently apply only it. In practice, however, neither the
Supreme Court, as an institution, nor individual Justices have sought
such consistency. While original-public-meaning originalism has
28
emerged as the favored variant in the academy today, even the judges most committed to originalism have arrived at no such methodo29
logical consensus. The result is that even when the Justices pursue
an originalist inquiry, there remains disagreement, albeit sometimes
unarticulated, about which version to apply.
An oft-cited case pitting different variants of originalism against
30
each other is District of Columbia v. Heller. The Second Amendment
reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
31
infringed.” The core question in Heller was whether that right to
bear arms is limited to militia service or rather protects an individual
32
right unconnected with militia service. The Court, in a 5-4 decision,
held that the Second Amendment was not limited to militia service,
but extended to other traditional lawful purposes, such as self33
defense within the home.
Scholars have hailed Heller as a “triumph of originalism” because
both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice John Paul Stevens’s
dissent engaged in originalist reasoning (and, even Justice Stephen

26

27
28

29

30
31
32
33

(arguing that in order to succeed, originalism requires a way to measure the proper level
of generality).
See Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 292 (arguing that judges who invoke originalism have
significant discretion in molding their approach to create results consistent with their
own ideologies).
See infra Part II.A.
See Berman, supra note 7, at 4 (“[M]any self-described originalists have shifted their allegiance from original intent to original public meaning.”); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 703–04
(2009) (arguing that in originalist circles, the new originalists’ efforts to discover the “objective meaning” of the Constitution have carried the day recently).
See Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 293–305 (arguing that three ostensibly originalist
judges—Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Judge Bork—all choose the version of
originalism in a given case that allows them to reach their desired result).
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
Id. at 635.
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34

Breyer’s dissent relied substantially on historical evidence).
But,
Heller also highlights originalism’s malleability. Indeed, Heller calls attention to the fact that different originalist inquiries can yield dramatically different results. As Lawrence Solum has argued, Justices
35
Scalia and Stevens approach originalism differently in Heller.
Whereas Justice Scalia’s majority opinion purports to be a study of
the Second Amendment’s original public meaning, focusing on the
36
text’s meaning at ratification, Justice Stevens’s dissent often focuses
on the purposes animating the Second Amendment and the inten37
tions of its drafters. For example, as Professor Solum points out,
Justice Stevens emphasized that “[t]he history of the adoption of the
Amendment . . . describes an overriding concern about the potential
threat to state sovereignty that a federal standing army would pose,
and a desire to protect the States’ militias as the means by which to
38
guard against that danger.” Justice Stevens, here, is examining the
Framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions behind the Second Amendment.
Justice Scalia, by comparison, closely examines the language of the
Second Amendment and eighteenth-century usage, studying, for instance, period dictionaries to contend that the Second Amendment
term “keep and bear arms” did not solely connote use of weapons in
39
the military context. While intentions and meaning sometimes coincide, the 5-4 originalist split in Heller makes some sense if we recognize that the majority and dissent were simply engaged in different
inquiries.
It is also significant, however, that neither Justice Scalia’s nor Justice Stevens’s originalism is methodologically pure. While Justice
Scalia does devote a significant portion of his opinion to publicmeaning originalism, his choice of sources sometimes belies that ap34
35

36

37

38
39

See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191, 191 (2008) (citing scholars’ celebration of Heller’s use of originalism).
See Solum, supra note 16, at 957 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion focused on the semantic meaning of the operative clause while Justice Stevens’s opinion focused on the
purpose or teleological meaning of the Second Amendment).
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that
‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’” (quoting
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))).
See Solum, supra note 16, at 957 (arguing that the disagreement between Justices Scalia
and Stevens in Heller roughly “corresponds to the difference between original intentions
originalism and original meaning originalism”).
Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting))(internal quotation marks
omitted).
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581–92 (citing, inter alia, Samuel Johnson’s dictionary and eighteenth-century statutes and state constitutions); see also Solum, supra note 16, at 955–56
(discussing Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion).
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proach. For example, as Professor Saul Cornell argues, though Justice Scalia purports to examine the role of preambles in eighteenthcentury legal texts, most of his sources are from the nineteenth cen40
tury, which treated preambles differently. Justice Scalia also cites
41
post-Civil War legislation and commentary. This evidence may be
relevant to the incorporation question that the Court would later
42
confront in McDonald v. City of Chicago, but it is, at best, tangential to
the Second Amendment’s original meaning, unless one assumes (in43
correctly) that meanings cannot change over time. Whatever Justice
44
Scalia’s motives for selecting this evidence, his apparent willingness
to conflate eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal conventions suggests either an uncharacteristic attention to the evolution of constitutional concepts or a surprising inattention to proper historical
sources.
Likewise, though portions of the dissent seem devoted to purpose,
rather than meaning, Justice Stevens also includes some originalpublic-meaning analysis. For example, Justice Stevens examined several state declarations of rights to contend that the operative clause,
“keep and bear arms,” in eighteenth-century constitutional texts con45
noted “military uses of firearms.” It is true that Justice Stevens sometimes articulates his conclusions in terms of the Framers’ “focus,” ra46
ther than the language’s meaning.
Such arguably unfortunate
phrasing is part of the reason some scholars have characterized his
47
dissent as concerned with purpose, rather than meaning. Nevertheless, this attention to the Framers’ “focus” should not hide the fact
that, in comparing the language of similar eighteenth-century consti-

40
41
42
43

44
45
46

47

See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 632–33 (2008).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 614–19.
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 613 (2008) (noting changes in the First Amendment’s meaning during the early decades of its existence);
cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 137–294
(1998) (discussing how conceptions of certain rights changed during the Reconstruction
period).
Cf. Cornell, supra note 40, at 63334 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s choice of sources in Heller was opportunistic).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 642–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 643 (citing state declarations of rights to argue “that the Framers’ singleminded focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee ‘to keep and bear Arms’ was on
military uses of firearms”).
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 16, at 957.
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tutional texts, Justice Stevens is also examining revolutionary-era lin48
guistic conventions, thereby examining original public meaning.
To this extent, Heller demonstrates that Justices can disagree both
on originalist methodologies and on the proper interpretation within
one methodology, thus raising questions about originalism’s capacity
to identify the correct Constitution with which to constrain judges.
Indeed, Heller’s 5-4 split suggests that originalism cannot deliver the
lost ark of objectivity. From this perspective, far from emerging triumphant in Heller, originalism “struck out as an objective methodolo49
gy.”
Indeed, Heller offers but one example of this judicial inconsistency. Justice Scalia has been the Court’s most vocal champion of origi50
nal-public-meaning originalism. Nevertheless, he hardly follows that
interpretive methodology consistently himself. For example, he has
argued that the Eighth Amendment’s clause prohibiting “cruel and
unusual punishment” binds future generations to society’s concep51
tions of cruelty in 1791, even though the word “unusual” seems to
invite a comparative inquiry into contemporary punishment practic52
es. As Jack Balkin has pointed out, Justice Scalia’s argument here is
rooted not in original public meaning, but in original expected application, suggesting that even Justice Scalia, the new originalism’s
most prominent judicial advocate, does not always heed the distinc53
tions between its numerous variants.
Justice Scalia has also authored or joined several opinions which
54
hold states immune from suits by their own citizens, even though
48

See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 1 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY
(1755)).
Daniel O. Conkle, Judicial Activism and Fourteenth Amendment Privacy Claims: The Allure of
Originalism and the Unappreciated Promise of Constrained Nonoriginalism, 14 NEXIS 31, 36
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY BY ANTONIN SCALIA 3, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann et
al. eds., 1997) (arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the original meaning of the text).
See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 50, at 129, 140;
see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (Scalia, J., majority opinion) (noting that in the Eighth Amendment context, “[t]he actions of the First Congress . . . are of
course persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means”).
See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 259, 261 (2009) (“[T]he words ‘cruel and unusual’ invite a comparative inquiry.”).
See Balkin, supra note 15, at 296 (“Scalia’s version of ‘original meaning’ is not original
meaning . . . but actually a more limited interpretive principle, what I call original expected
application.”).
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that the suit was barred by the
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
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50

51

52
53

54
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the text of the Eleventh Amendment limits such immunity to suits
“commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
55
State.” One might defend these votes on several grounds, such as
the fact that the Eleventh Amendment does not explicitly deny states
immunity in suits brought by their own citizens. In light of this textual ambiguity, one could cite original history favoring a broader state
sovereign immunity or defer to precedent protecting states against
56
suits prosecuted by their own citizens. These are not crazy arguments, but they are not new-originalist arguments. To the contrary,
given what John Manning calls the text’s “carefully drawn alignment
57
of parties,” the better new-originalist reading is that state sovereign
immunity (whether newly granted or pre-existing in Article III) only
extends to those suits specifically identified by the Amendment’s
58
text.
Of course, judicial inconsistency does not necessarily reflect a flaw
59
in the theory itself. But, the fact that originalism is sufficiently openended so as to encompass these (and other) approaches suggests that
its ability to constrain is overstated. Given the significant judicial and
scholarly attention to originalism during the past few decades, its
failure to limit judicial choices in practice should cause us to question
60
whether it can, in fact, achieve such a thing.
B. Originalism’s Implementation
There is also substantial disagreement about how to implement
originalism—that is, on when and how originalism should provide a

55
56

57
58
59

60

261, 269 (1997) (same); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (same);
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781–82 (1991) (holding that a convention did not surrender the state’s immunity).
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (“That a State cannot be sued by a citizen of
another State, or of a foreign state . . . is clearly established by the decisions of this court
in several recent cases.”); infra Part II.B.
John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113
YALE L.J. 1663, 1666 (2004).
See id. at 1723 (“A venerable maxim of construction holds that when a specific and a general provision address the same subject, the specific governs the general.”).
See Lawrence B. Solum, Living with Originalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra
note 4, at 143, 163 (noting that objections to particular judges’ applications of
originalism is not a sound objection to the theory itself); infra Part II.A.
See generally CROSS, supra note 25, at 73–151; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) (noting that the terms
“meaning,” “intention,” and “understanding” “are often used loosely and synonymously,
at some cost to the clarity that [originalism] ostensibly seeks”).
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rule of decision. For instance, originalist-minded Justices disagree
about whether originalist analysis is appropriate in every case or just
61
There is similar disagreement about whether
some cases.
originalism should be the sole guide to constitutional decision making or one of many. These disagreements have been explored by
62
other scholars but are worth revisiting briefly to emphasize that even
judges committed to originalism do not agree on how or when to apply it.
Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas are the two current Justices
most inclined towards originalism, but they approach the theory
quite differently. Their disagreement about the incorporation of the
63
Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago well illustrates the
difference. Both Justices agreed with Justice Samuel Alito’s majority
opinion that the Second Amendment right announced in Heller
should be incorporated to apply against the states. Justice Thomas,
however, wrote a bold concurrence in which he rejected decades of
doctrine analyzing incorporation through the Due Process Clause of
64
the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, he contended, on originalist
grounds, that “the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth
65
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.” By contrast, Justice
66
Scalia, who once professed to be a “faint-hearted originalist,” concurred separately, writing that “[d]espite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the
Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights be67
cause it is both long established and narrowly limited.” In other
words, both Justices disapproved of incorporation through the Due
Process Clause, but only one was willing actually to abandon that wellsettled doctrine. Even originalists, then, disagree on when originalist
61

62
63
64

65
66

67

Cf. Berman, supra note 7, at 22 (“Originalism proper is strong originalism—the thesis that
original meaning either is the only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation
or that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate meanings the text might
bear . . . .”).
See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity
in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); infra notes 81–87.
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
See id. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he reason the Framers codified this right to
bear arms in the Second Amendment . . . was the very reason citizens could not enforce it
against States through the Fourteenth.”).
Id.
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). Justice
Scalia recently “repudiated” that self-description, saying that he tries to be a “stouthearted” originalist. See Senior, supra note 21.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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68

principles should decide a case. As Professor Michael C. Dorf puts
it, “An inconsistent originalism that accommodates change sometimes but not always thereby sacrifices originalism’s claim to constrain
judges and its claim to be the exclusive legitimate source of interpre69
tive guidance.”
Another variable is the clarity of the original meaning. Many
people would agree that where the constitutional text is very clear, it
70
should presumptively provide a legally binding rule. Hence, there is
virtually unanimous agreement that Article II, Section 1, clause 5 requires that the President of the United States be at least thirty-five
71
years old. No reasonable interpretive gloss can disrupt sufficiently
72
that plain meaning so as to alter the Article II rule.
However, even the originalist Justices have failed to explain how
the relative clarity of the original meaning should affect the Court’s
willingness to rely on originalist analysis. One could take the view
that any reasonably clear and precise constitutional text should be
73
treated as a binding rule. Neither the Court nor the originalist Justices, however, have adopted that approach. For example, the
Court’s free speech doctrine departs from the First Amendment’s
plain text in two significant ways. The First Amendment reads, “Con74
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Interpreted strictly, the Amendment forbids all congressional abridge68

69

70

71
72

73

74

Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 772 (1988) (“[I]f the Court legitimately may prevent inquiry into original understanding in order to maintain transformative change, does this concession also license
prospective disregard of original understanding when the Court is satisfied that change is
necessary to maintain systemic equilibrium?”).
Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2036 (2012) (reviewing
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2010)).
See Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 221
(1988) (“[Some] interpreters . . . treat the text as the overriding source where it speaks
clearly . . . .”). But see infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“[N]either shall any Person be eligible to that Office [of
the President] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years . . . .”).
See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle Originalism
and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 949 (2009) (arguing that this clause is “relatively determinate”). But see Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 78, 85–86 (noting that different cultures
calculate age differently).
See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (“Where a determinate original meaning can be
ascertained and is inconsistent with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should
be reversed and the original meaning adopted in their place.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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ments of speech. Of course, as most law students know, the Court’s
free speech doctrine is not so absolute, permitting some speech re75
strictions. Moreover, despite the text’s clarity, the doctrine extends
beyond “Congress” to the executive branch (and to the state govern76
ments through incorporation doctrine).
The originalists on the
Court have not attempted to reconcile apparently clear textual mandates with contrary precedent.
Another puzzle for implementing originalism in practice is
whether to “translate” original meaning to a contemporary world in
77
which circumstances have dramatically changed. How should the
faithful originalist apply the Founding generation’s views to a radical78
One might imagine a range of possible aply different world?
79
proaches. At one extreme, a Justice might try to follow the original
intended application of the relevant provision, trying to decide the
case today as it would have been decided at the moment of the provi80
sion’s ratification. An alternative approach, as Lawrence Lessig suggests, would adjust the literal text to preserve its meaning and pur81
pose in light of contextual changes.
For example, our Constitution’s balance between state and federal
powers is deeply contested, but both sides generally agree that Article
I granted some authority to the federal government and left authority
over local affairs to state and local governments. The Commerce
Clause allocates some of this power, empowering the federal gov82
ernment to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.” A
key question in our federalism is just how much authority the Commerce Clause confers upon Congress. An originalist could explore
this question in different ways. One approach would be to limit Congress’s commerce authority today to the precise powers it enjoyed
when the Constitution was first ratified in 1788, a position Justice
75
76
77

78
79
80
81
82

See infra notes 72, 195, and accompanying text.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (deciding whether a statute, as applied
by state courts, violated the Due Process Clause).
See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 22 (2010) (“This basic problem—what
do you do when circumstances change?—can occur whenever someone has an obligation
to follow instructions given by another person and cannot communicate with the person
who gave the instructions.”); Lessig, supra note 62, at 1201 (“In trying to find equivalents
between two relatively autonomous systems of meaning, the translator—despite her traditional mechanic guise—must judge how the gaps will be filled.”).
See David E. Strauss, The Death of Judicial Conservatism, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
3 (2009) (discussing the ways that Justices can interpret the Constitution).
See generally Lessig, supra note 62.
See id. at 1171 (explaining what strict originalist interpretation entails).
Id. at 1174–82.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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83

Thomas has suggested. A different approach would be to recognize
that the scope of the national economy and interstate commerce has
increased dramatically since the eighteenth century and to hold that
the scope of Congress’s commerce authority necessarily expands in
84
proportion to those changes. In other words, as the markets operating on a national scale grew, so too should the “predicate for federal
85
power.”
Both the “original-intended application” and the translated “original-proportion-to-the-national-economy” approach can fairly claim to
be originalist, but the Justices have offered no approach for determining which originalism is more legitimate. Indeed, despite over
three decades of great judicial and scholarly attention to originalism,
the Justices’ originalism is badly under-theorized, barely acknowledging these kinds of questions, let alone wrestling with them honestly
86
and systematically.
Given the Court’s inattention to these basic
methodological questions, it is hard to take seriously the contention
that originalism in practice fixes the “correct” Constitution and con87
strains judicial decision making.
II. THE NEW ORIGINALISM’S SHORTCOMINGS
A. The New Originalism Described
Just because originalism in practice fails to fix an objective constitutional meaning or constrain judicial decision making does not
mean that it could not do so were a single variant more faithfully applied. The problems just rehearsed arise from the fact that the Justices do not consistently apply the same version of originalism. These
are problems with originalism in practice, not originalism in theory.

83

84
85
86

87

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is
inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s
early Commerce Clause cases.” (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125, 137–54.
Id. at 140.
See Michael C. Dorf, Tainted Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 937–38 (2012) (“[D]espite the
shift in academic defenses of originalism, judges and others continue to invoke the older,
more simple-minded expected-applications version of originalism.”).
See CROSS, supra note 25, at 190 (concluding that Justices’ invocation of originalism “is
very selective and not particularly constraining on the decisions or opinions of the justices”); Strauss, supra note 78, at 3 (arguing that one problem with originalism is “that it is
not doable” in practice).
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The obvious solution to these inconsistencies would be to select a
single version of originalism and always stick to it. The best candidate
for this proposal is the new originalism, because it is the most widely
accepted today among originalists and the most theoretically sophis88
ticated. While I share John Harrison’s skepticism that judges will
89
confine themselves to a single interpretive approach, especially given that their fellow jurists would not be similarly constrained, it is also
worth examining the theory on its own terms. Indeed, the new
originalist, I imagine, would largely agree with much of what I have
said so far. The problem, he would contend, is that Supreme Court
Justices have not been faithful, methodologically consistent
90
originalists. Consistent adherence to new originalism would accomplish the goals of fixation and constraint—and more.
Scholars, like Randy Barnett, Lawrence Solum, and Keith Whittington, have developed the new originalism in a rigorous, intelligent
91
literature.
Because these new originalists focus on the objective
plain meaning of the document, they ostensibly need not worry about
weighing the Framers’ or ratifiers’ subjective views against each oth92
er. Instead, they focus on linguistic facts contemporaneous to ratification to discern the language’s semantic meaning. As Whittington
puts it, the new originalism “urges interpreters to look to the text and
what a competent reader of the text at the time would have under-

88

89

90

91

92

See Colby, supra note 7, at 724 (arguing that an inquiry into how a reasonable person
would have understood the words in the Constitution in 1788 is a more refined and sophisticated form of originalism than original intent or original understanding).
See John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 473, 473–74 (2008) (expressing skepticism about originalism’s capacity to
constrain judicial activism).
See, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND
ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 126 (2012) (“Justices Thomas and Scalia have often advocated originalism as their preferred method of constitutional interpretation but neither
Justice has any use for that doctrine when it leads to a result they don’t favor such as approving affirmative action programs.”); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of
“Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2006) (“Justice Scalia is simply not an
originalist.”); Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist?: Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and
the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 882 (2011) (arguing that Justice
Thomas is a less faithful originalist than the conventional wisdom suggests).
Despite much common ground, there are also important variations among the new
originalists, see infra note 190, but it is beyond the scope of this Article to rehearse all these distinctions.
See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1162 (2003) (“As a matter of constitutional interpretation, it matters not what any (much less all) of the Ratifiers actually intended or understood,
but what the hypothetical reasonably well-informed Ratifier would have objectively understood the legal text to mean with all of the relevant information in hand.”).
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93

stood it to mean.” The result, the new originalists argue, is a more
94
objective and theoretically legitimate originalism.
The new originalism, also known as “semantic originalism” or
95
“original public meaning originalism,” contends “that constitutional
law includes rules with content that are fixed by the original public
meaning of the text—the conventional semantic meaning of the
96
words and phrases in context.” As Professor Solum explains, new
originalists implement this theory in a two-step process consisting,
first, of constitutional interpretation and, second, of constitutional con97
struction. The first step for the semantic originalist is to interpret the
Constitution by studying how contemporaneous sources of conventional meaning, such as newspapers, diaries, dictionaries, speeches,
98
pamphlets, and legal documents, used particular words and phrases.
(In this sense, the search for the original semantic meaning can utilize some of the same sources used to discern the Framers’ intentions
and ratifiers’ understandings.)
From this evidence, the new
originalist gleans the original public meaning of the relevant provi99
sion. In some cases, this semantic meaning in context will provide
the rule of decision, thereby constraining the interpreter to follow
that rule. However, constitutional provisions are often too abstract to
provide decisive guidance, and, in those cases when the text “runs
100
out,” the next step requires the judge to construct constitutional
meaning—that is, to supply content to the legal language to decide
101
During this constitutional construction, judges “must be
the case.
guided by something other than the semantic content of the constitu-

93
94

95
96
97
98

99
100
101

Whittington, supra note 1, at 70, 71–72.
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 648 (1999)
(asserting that the new originalism avoids the objections that have been raised against
subjective originalism and provides a structural framework of interpretation).
I use these three terms interchangeably.
Solum, supra note 17, at 2.
Id. at 67–69.
See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the
Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 915 (2013) (discerning original
public meaning by looking at “dictionaries, speeches, newspaper articles, documents, legislative histories, and historical events”).
Solum, supra note 17, at 67.
Id. at 69.
See Barnett, supra note 73, at 264 (“The process of applying general abstract provisions to
the facts of particular cases by adopting intermediate doctrines is properly called, not interpretation, but constitutional construction.”); see also Solum, supra note 17, at 68–69
(explaining that the practice of supplying content beyond semantic meaning is “constitutional construction”).
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102

tional text” so long as they do not violate the boundaries estab103
lished by the original semantic meaning.
The new originalism intelligently corrects some of originalism’s
earlier variants’ flaws and candidly acknowledges that original public
meaning cannot resolve all cases by itself. Indeed, at the construction
step, some new originalists abandon the claim that the theory con104
strains judicial decision making. However, the new originalism still
does contend that the original semantic meaning sets the boundaries
of constitutional meaning, and many new originalists, following the
lead of “old” originalists, insist that the theory does constrain judicial
decision making by requiring judges to follow an objective, ascertain105
able constitutional meaning. This theory helpfully reminds judges
and scholars not to forget constitutional text and history, but, to the
extent that it purports to fix an objective constitutional meaning and
thereby cabin judicial discretion, it cannot deliver what it promises.
B. Fixation Problems
The new originalism’s effort to fix the correct constitutional
meaning assumes that it can accurately discern an objective original
constitutional meaning. This may sometimes be possible. However,
for many provisions most likely to arise in litigation, the notion of a
“right answer” is a legal fiction that fails to appreciate both the practical difficulties of historical inquiry and the relevant history itself. As
Mark Tushnet puts it, “[t]he new originalism seeks the original public
meaning of constitutional terms, but there is (was) no single such
106
meaning . . . at least for interesting constitutional terms.”
First, just like older iterations of originalism, semantic originalism
fails to appreciate fully the complexity and contradictions often in107
herent in the relevant historical evidence.
The new originalism
purports to correct this evidentiary problem because, unlike searches
for the Framers’ or ratifiers’ subjective intentions, semantic
originalism does not involve the difficulty of ostensibly uncovering a
102
103
104
105

106
107

Solum, supra note 17, at 19; see also Whittington, supra note 1, at 82; discussion infra Part
II.
See Barnett, supra note 73, at 263–64.
See infra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
See Solum, supra note 17, at 2 (“Almost all originalists agree, explicitly or implicitly, that
the meaning (or ‘semantic content’) of a given Constitutional provision was fixed at the
time the provision was framed and ratified.”); infra note 187 (citing arguments that new
originalism will constrain judicial decision making).
Tushnet, supra note 43, at 617.
See, e.g., Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1034 (2011) (referring to Clio as “an uncertain, almost whimsical guide”).
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108

collective body’s single intention.
Instead, new originalists, like
Professor Solum, drawing on the linguistic work of Paul Grice and
others, seek to find the relevant constitutional provision’s “sentence
meaning” by identifying objective “meanings that are conventional
109
given relevant linguistic practices” at the time of ratification. Those
110
meanings are “facts determined by the evidence.”
Fixation is an understandable impulse, especially given that our
111
Constitution, unlike the English one, is written. However, we cannot always (or even often) accurately discern how “a reasonable
112
speaker of English” would have understood a constitutional provision. To be sure, we sometimes can. As already discussed, Article II,
read in accordance with eighteenth- (or twenty-first-) century linguis113
tic conventions, requires that the President be at least thirty-five.
114
But, many constitutional provisions, like the Second Amendment,
are contested in part because the evidence surrounding their original
meaning is complicated and contradictory. The disagreement between Justices Scalia and Stevens was not solely methodological. It
was also based on different interpretations of the kinds of evidence
that ostensibly give rise to semantic meaning, such as the way eighteenth-century texts used prefatory clauses and the phrase “keep and
115
bear arms.”
The problem for the new originalism’s fixation claims is that provisions like the Second Amendment are far more likely to be the subject of dispute and litigation than provisions like Article II, Section 1,
clause 5. Contrary to the conflicting opinions’ self-assured tones in
116
Heller, it is far from clear who was correct. Indeed, the mere fact of

108

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

116

See, e.g., Solum, supra note 17, at 42–50 (emphasizing the superiority of constitutional interpretation based on the original semantic meaning of the words, as opposed to the collective intent of the Framers).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
See BARNETT, supra note 16, at 100–09 (emphasizing that the Constitution’s “writtenness”
“locks in” meaning).
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105
(2001).
See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text; infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30–49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40–49. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)
(“The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason
Americans valued the ancient right . . . .”), with id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The
preamble thus both sets forth the object of the Amendment and informs the meaning of
the remainder of its text.”).
See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV.
253, 266 (2009) (“If there is a reasonable case for the majority’s interpretation of the Se-
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the 5-4 split on originalist grounds—and the accompanying scholarly
117
disagreement —suggests that the “correct” answer here will be deeply contested.
Other provisions are likewise contested. For example, excellent
scholars not only disagree on the original meaning of the Commerce
Clause, but also defend interpretations that would yield opposite out118
comes in most contemporary cases.
Similarly, scholars disagree
119
about whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe can
be justified on original-public-meaning grounds. Bolling, decided the
120
same day as Brown v. Board of Education, invalidated federal racial
public school segregation in the District of Columbia, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, which stipulates that “No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec121
tion of the laws.”
Some scholars have offered creative defenses of
Bolling on new originalist grounds by contending that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause foreclosed the federal government
from denying United States citizens the rights inherent in federal cit122
izenship, including equal protection of the laws.
Others have insisted instead that the Equal Protection Clause means what it says and
123
only applies to state governments.
While most commentators ap-

117

118

119
120
121
122

123

cond Amendment, there is also a reasonable case for the position taken by the dissenters.”).
Compare Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss,
Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1111 (2009) (criticizing the new originalism
and Heller’s “backwards approach to history”), with Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (defending Heller as the
“finest example of . . . ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court”).
Compare Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 (2010) (“The original meaning
of the Commerce Clause is consistent with the modern activist state and gives the federal
government wide latitude to pass civil rights, employment, consumer protection, health,
and environmental laws.”), with Barnett, supra note 112, at 146 (“The most persuasive evidence of original meaning . . . strongly supports Justice Thomas’s . . . narrow interpretation of Congress’s [Commerce] power . . . .”).
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
See Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 598
(2013) (“[T]here is a strong basis for concluding that whatever equality rights citizens
possess against state governments by virtue of their status as ‘persons’ protected by the
Equal Protection Clause are equally enforceable against the federal government by virtue
of their status as ‘citizens’ under the Citizenship Clause.”).
See BORK, supra note 2, at 83 (criticizing Bolling as a “clear rewriting of the Constitution by
the Warren Court”); Brest, supra note 7, at 232–33 (“[A] moderate originalist cannot easily justify the incorporation of principles of equal treatment into the due process clause of
the fifth amendment . . . .”).
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plaud the result in Bolling, they disagree about whether it is consistent
124
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s original public meaning.
While compelling arguments sometimes can be made in favor of
one reading over another, the process of selection almost necessarily
involves historical judgments that judges lack both the time and train125
ing to make, especially in light of the surrounding historical context, which cannot be quickly gleaned during the few months in
126
which a judge considers a case. Because of these problems, judges
127
are likely to take shortcuts in evaluating the evidence and to fall
back on preconceptions about history and language, as well as nor128
mative predilections.
While it is perfectly natural for judges to be
influenced by norms in close cases, it is misleading to say that the resulting decision then rests on the “correct” reading of the original
129
semantic meaning.
To be fair, some new originalists, like Professor Solum, are careful
to emphasize the “modesty” of the claim and the fact that, sometimes,
130
we cannot know what the relevant linguistic facts are. For example,
Solum acknowledges that evidence is sometimes not accessible to dis131
cern the text’s original public meaning. The dearth of evidence is a
132
problem, no doubt, but so is too much contradictory evidence. Of

124
125
126

127

128
129

130
131
132

It is worth noting that a theory that eviscerated Bolling would be, for good reason, morally
objectionable to many and therefore extremely difficult to sell.
Cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The battle of the
string citations can have no winner.”); infra note 220 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 580 (2011) (denigrating “law-office history” searching for historical citations to bolster legal arguments).
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1485, 1495 (2012) (arguing that judicial analysis of history is “susceptible to manipulation”); Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1232–42 (2012) (detailing how several ostensibly originalist Supreme Court opinions are not).
See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 267 (2d ed. 1995) (“A person
who is trying to understand a text is always projecting.”); infra Conclusion.
See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1334
(2008) (claiming that when judges are not adept at evaluating judicial evidence,
originalism may produce biased decisions); Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1045–46 (2002) (describing the dangers that may occur when a judge
is biased in selecting and using interpretive approaches).
Solum, supra note 17, at 37.
Id.
See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909,
930 (1998) (“Because the historical evidence is often inadequate and contradictory, the
historical record rarely yields any clear answers to the most important questions of constitutional interpretation.”); Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause Answers That History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1617, 1630 (“With regard to our de-
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course, there will be instances when the vast majority of the evidence
stacks up comfortably on one side of the ledger, and we can be reasonably confident that the hypothetical, well-informed observer in
1788 would have understood a certain clause in a particular manner.
But, as Heller demonstrates, there are also important instances where
the evidence is so complicated that judges divide (roughly) evenly on
133
the proper interpretation.
Read modestly, of course, semantic
134
originalism could concede this point, but if it does, it will leave us
with a theory that does most of its work in the cases about which we
135
mostly agree anyway.
A second and related problem with the new originalism’s efforts
to fix objective original meaning is that the inquiry undervalues the
136
intellectual flux that characterized many key constitutional periods.
For example, constitutional concepts and terms changed shape fre137
quently during the Founding era. Attempts to “fix” a single meaning to particular terms or provisions miss the age’s intellectual ferment. Key constitutional concepts—like sovereignty, bicameralism,
federalism, individual rights, and executive power—were vigorously
debated and constantly changing during the closing decades of the
138
eighteenth century. The fixation thesis ascribes to the constitutional terms addressing these and other concepts a singular meaning that
cannot capture the complexity and multiplicity of meanings that the
terms then enjoyed.
Indeed, prominent historians of the American Revolution have
spent much of their careers exploring these intellectual transfor-

133

134
135
136

137

138

termination of what the Constitution means today, the contradictory historical evidence is
simply not dispositive.”).
Cf. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 10 (1961) (“The belief in a hard core of
historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.”).
See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer detailed historical analysis. For excellent
studies examining the difficulty of identifying original meanings during the Founding
and Reconstruction periods, respectively, see generally RAKOVE, supra note 60; WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE (1988).
See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 40, at 631 (noting originalists’ inattention to how meanings
changed over time); Rakove, supra note 126, at 577–78 (arguing that the meanings of
constitutional terms change over time).
See generally RAKOVE, supra note 60 at 3–22 (discussing the perils of originalism); GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787 (1969) (detailing a series of intellectual changes in the political culture and belief systems in revolutionary
America).
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139

mations.
To give just one example, Americans’ ideas about the
140
“executive” were in constant flux in the 1780s. Not only did members of the Founding generation disagree on what the Article II executive should look like, but they also disagreed on the meaning of
141
the words “executive” and “president,” relying on accumulated but
conflicting experiences under both British rule and state constitu142
tions.
The meaning of these words could have profound implications for current debates about the scope of Article II authority, the
143
prerogatives of a unitary executive, the President’s removal power,
and more. By attempting to fix the meaning of constitutional terms
to a date in time—as though the meaning at any given point was static—is to misunderstand the revolutionary era’s intellectual motion.
As Jack Rakove puts it,
[P]olitical language, like other forms of speech, is necessarily creative,
and . . . key words develop and acquire new shades of meaning precisely
because they are subjected to the pressures of active controversy. The
adopters of the Constitution inhabited a world that was actively concerned with the nature of language, or more to the point, the instability
of linguistic meanings, and commentators on the ratification debates
have observed the extent to which arguments about the definitions of key
words and concepts were themselves central elements of political de144
bate.

Key constitutional terms and ideas were similarly fluid when the
Reconstruction amendments were drafted and ratified. As William
Nelson has argued, the words “equality” and “liberty” were used in
145
very different ways in antebellum America.
The concept of “liberty,” for instance, resonated strongly with abolitionists, slaveholders as139

140
141
142

143
144
145

See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
160–229 (1967) (recounting transformations in the Founding generation’s conceptions
of ideas like representation and consent, constitution and rights, and sovereignty);
RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 94–338 (discussing the evolution of several important constitutional concepts during the revolutionary period); WOOD, supra note 138, at 370–82 (discussing changes in Americans’ conceptions of “sovereignty” during the Founding period); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 259 (1991)
(noting that though the Anti-federalists “lost the battle over the Constitution,” their values continued to shape popular understandings of American government for decades).
See RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 244–87.
See, e.g., id. at 245 (“Deriving a single definition of executive power could never be a simple exercise.”).
One problem was that the word “president” sounded common and weak. Indeed, the
more muscular state executives were called not “presidents” but “governors.” See AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 133–35 (2005) (discussing controversy over the
choice of the word “president” in Article II); see also RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 244–87.
See RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 347–48 (discussing the “removal debate”).
Rakove, supra note 126, at 593.
NELSON, supra note 136, at 13–39.
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serting their own property rights, and state governments trying to re146
sist federal coercion. Similarly, as Nelson argues, Americans in the
years immediately after the Civil War agreed upon the rightfulness of
“equality” only because their understandings of the word’s meaning
147
differed so dramatically. It is no wonder, then, that the words representing these contexts were highly under-determinate, as the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers and framers debated their “vague,
148
open-ended, and sometimes clashing” meanings.
Indeed, these
words’ very ambiguities probably helped secure the amendment’s ratification. As Professor Nelson explains, the congressmen and state
legislators debating the Fourteenth Amendment “continued to make
fuzzy use of the old antebellum ideas [of liberty and equality], in
part, perhaps, because the old imprecision . . . enabled them to retain the support of political coalitions whose individual members
shared an agreement only about vague ideas, not specific pro149
grams.”
It may be linguistically defensible to ascribe to all constitutional
terms a single semantic meaning, but, even putting aside almost inevitable evidentiary problems, from a historical standpoint, it is a canard to assume that all these provisions can be so boiled down, given
both the contentious debate about the underlying ideas and the fact
that these concepts were in the process of radical transformations.
Purporting to freeze the terms at a point in history cannot accurately
capture one semantic meaning at a given point during a severaldecade transformative process. Put simply, it ascribes a singular semantic meaning to terms embodying multiple, evolving, and sometimes contradictory ideas.
In light of these problems, most historians are highly skeptical of
150
attempts to freeze history or meaning.
New originalists would
counter here that historians are unconcerned with semantic mean151
ing.
This is usually correct, but it is unclear that this distinction
undermines the historians’ objections. A historian like Rakove may
not write explicitly about semantic meaning, but his basic point—that
political language evolves during periods of revolutionary change—
146
147
148
149
150

151

Id. at 21–36.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 38–39.
See Eric Foner, The Supreme Court’s Legal History, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 243, 244 (1992) (“To
freeze history at any single moment, such as the spring of 1866, misses the essence of the
era, which was continuous and far-reaching change.”).
See Solum, supra note 17, at 112–15 (arguing that many historians do not seek semantic
meaning).
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applies to “semantic meaning” as much as it does to history in the
looser sense. Because conceptions of the executive were evolving in
the 1780s, so too were the public meanings of the words “executive”
152
and “president” in flux.
To some extent, the disagreement between new-originalist legal
scholars, on the one hand, and historians, on the other, reflects a disagreement about judges’ (and scholars’) ability to locate objective
truths about our Constitution. This difference should not be overstated. I concede that some provisions have objective meanings (the
President must be at least thirty-five), and some new originalists con153
cede that some original public meanings are unknowable. The disagreement, then, boils down to the number of instances in which the
new originalism actually can provide an objective semantic meaning
that sufficiently constrains judicial choices in actual cases likely to
arise. Whereas the new originalists apparently believe that the theory
will identify some objective original semantic meanings that will bind
interpreters in real cases, I believe that in most cases that we care
about, the evidence will not be so clear. Perhaps in some of those
cases, the evidence will tend to favor one reading over another, but
then, semantic originalism would be basing its interpretation on
probabilities, not certainty. This is not to say that language does not
communicate and text has no meaning. Of course, such an extreme
154
position is confused, but that is not the objection. The objections,
instead, are that sometimes, reasonable hypothetical observers would
have divided along roughly even lines on the correct meaning of a
constitutional provision, and oftentimes, the evidence will be too
complicated for us to know how such observers would have understood the language.
It is not entirely clear how the new originalist should proceed with
complicated, inconclusive historical evidence yielding no clearly correct, objective original semantic meaning. One possibility would be
for the judge to take the more likely reading and treat it as the original semantic meaning, essentially treating a probably correct reading
as a definitely correct one. It would be a legal fiction to assign probabilities to the correctness of semantic meanings based on the relevant evidence, but let us assume that we can. It seems relatively un152

153
154

See RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 252–53 (noting that 1770s’ state constitutions established
extremely weak executives but that in the 1780s some states began to revitalize the executive); supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
See Solum, supra note 17, at 37 (conceding that some public historical meanings may be
unknowable).
See id. at 119–20 (rejecting various semantic skeptics).
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problematic for the new-originalist judge to treat a reading that is
ninety-nine-percent likely correct as the original semantic meaning
and proceed with the constitutional analysis as though such semantic
meaning has been uncovered and thereby fixed. By contrast, it is
more problematic for the judge to do so when she is only fifty-onepercent sure that she is correct. The new originalism, by its own
155
terms, rests on the primacy of the objective constitutional text, so if
that textual foundation is shaky, it is dangerous to build a legal doctrine atop it. This does not mean that we must require absolute certainty for the original public meaning to be binding, but a substantial
degree of uncertainty weakens the textual foundation upon which
the entire theory rests.
Of course, other constitutional methodologies do permit judges
to make decisions based on uncertain judgments; a judge, for instance, may not be certain that she has construed a confusing precedent correctly. But, typical common-law constitutional decision making usually rests on multiple factors, such as precedent, reason,
structure, past practice, history, text, policy, and more. This hodgepodge of factors may render it unpredictable and worthy of criticism,
but it also means that an incorrect judgment on any single factor will
not undermine the whole foundation to the same extent. In other
words, if common-law constitutional adjudication is like a cable that
will remain intact if any thread is severed, then the new originalism is
more like a lone strand of thread. If the thread is cut, then the whole
theory fails to work.
Moreover, the new originalism precariously stakes its legitimacy
on especially problematic evidence. For all its flaws, precedent is easy
to find and limited in scope. It is also a source with which judges are
very familiar. By contrast, the historical evidence needed to identify
semantic meanings is often difficult to find and even harder to interpret, especially for judges, who usually lack training in historical
156
methods. It is also less limited, in that one can never be certain that
one has found all the relevant sources. Accordingly, we should be
more confident of judges’ ability to construe precedent “correctly”
than to construe the kinds of evidence relevant to original public
meanings. Of course, this concern may dissipate in those instances
where the judge is more confident in the correctness of her reading
155

156

See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66
(2011) (stressing that “the activity of determining semantic meaning at the time of enactment . . . is empirical” and hinges on the “objective social meaning” of the Constitution’s words).
See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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of the original public meaning than of the precedent, but given the
difficulties with the primary sources, those cases would probably be
157
relatively infrequent. Moreover, given their lack of familiarity with
the historical evidence, many judges may be prone to misread original materials without even realizing it.
In light of these problems, the new-originalist judge confronting
contradictory evidence may instead conclude, from any substantial
degree of uncertainty, that the text is under-determinate (whether
due to vagueness, ambiguities, gaps, or contradictions) and proceed
158
onto step two, constitutional construction.
Under this approach,
the judge need not worry about definitively resolving the meanings of
159
“executive” in the 1780s or “equality” and “liberty” in the 1860s be160
cause the words are still simply under-determinate.
Because the
judge turns from interpretation to construction, originalism more or
161
less falls out of play, and she may turn to other modalities to resolve
the case, provided that her decision falls within the range of ambigui162
ty created by the alternative plausible semantic meanings.
The
problem with this approach is that the new-originalist theory is likely
doing little work in most cases, except taking the judge through a difficult, time-consuming investigation only to end up where she started,
at step one.
The dispute between the new originalists and their critics partially
reflects a tension between law professors’ disciplinary allegiances outside the law, especially between linguistics and philosophy on the one
hand, and history on the other. To someone like Professor Solum,
who is deeply versed in philosophy and linguistic theory, texts have
objective, semantic meanings, and constitutional interpreters should
157
158

159
160

161
162

See supra notes 107–35 and accompanying text.
See Solum, supra note 17, at 69 (arguing that the role of constitutional construction begins when the inquiry into meaning has been exhausted); cf. Eric Berger, The Collision of
the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 595 (2006)
(“[I]t seems not only acceptable but desirable that we should account for the fact that
one doctrine is more likely correct than the other.”); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86
NW. U. L. REV. 859, 896 (1992) (“Why is it important that courts always be able to give definitive interpretations of the law?”).
See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
See NELSON, supra note 136, at 62–63 (noting that Reconstruction debates left the Fourteenth Amendment’s conflicting meanings to courts to reconcile); RAKOVE, supra note
60, at 279–87 (noting that ratification debates about the executive speak in generalities
but “say remarkably little about the specific constitutional arrangements”).
See Solum, supra note 17, at 67–75 (“Constitutional construction begins when the meaning discovered by constitutional interpretation runs out.”); infra Part II.C.
See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991) (describing
six different constitutional modalities: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical
and prudential).
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seek out the original semantic meanings of constitutional provisions.
Historians, he contends, have different concerns because they are not
163
after “semantic meanings.” Historians, in return, profess little interest
“in ascertaining the original meaning of a clause for its own sake, or
in attempting to freeze or distill its true, unadulterated meaning at
164
some pristine moment of constitutional understanding.”
Rather
than fixing a single meaning in terms, historians prefer to “revel in—
the ambiguities of the evidentiary record, recognizing that behind
the textual brevity of any clause there once lay a spectrum of complex
165
views and different shadings of opinion.”
Solum recognizes that lawyers, philosophers, linguists, and historians make mistakes when venturing beyond their disciplinary
boundaries and politely chides historians for not understanding the
166
philosophy of language.
But, in contending that texts have objective semantic meanings which can yield better constitutional decision
making, the new originalists sometimes undervalue historians’ repeated claims that, oftentimes, the evidentiary problems run too deep
and the relevant periods are too intellectually unstable for anyone to
identify a single “correct” constitutional meaning. Indeed, wellinformed observers during the relevant periods may have resisted the
notion that key constitutional terms enjoyed fixed meanings. As
Rakove points out, James Madison, relying on John Locke, discussed
the indeterminacy of words and the fallibility of language in The Fed167
eralist Papers. While certainly one excerpt from The Federalist Papers
is determinative of nothing, the Founding generation’s views on lan168
guage and meaning were likely more in line with Locke than Grice.
Accordingly, one wonders if the attempt to locate core, singular
meanings in those same people’s understandings of language, however philosophically justifiable, may rest on an historical anachronism
163

164
165
166
167

168

See Solum, supra note 17, at 115 (“When historians are after the meaning of legal texts,
they are frequently after something quite different; they are searching for the purpose or
reasons for which the text was written. Such purposes are not semantic meanings.”).
RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
See Solum, supra note 17, at 115 (“[F]ew historians . . . have basic competency in the philosophy of language . . . .”).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[N]o
language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen
that . . . the definition of [words] may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the
terms in which it is delivered.”); see also Rakove, supra note 126, at 594 (discussing Locke’s
influence on Madison’s views on language).
See Rakove, supra note 126, at 588 n.33, 600 (arguing that Locke’s philosophy on language influenced Madison’s perspective on language).
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that compromises the very enterprise. The new originalists might
counter that the meaning of “meaning” does not hinge on how dif169
ferent cultures perceive “meaning,” but if the Founding generation’s use and understanding of words included an implicit recognition of those words’ indeterminacy, that understanding would add yet
another layer of complexity and indeterminacy to an already complicated historical record.
Relatedly, the new originalists underestimate the extent to which
constitution-making sometimes renders language more unstable than
it would be in more ordinary circumstances. Even the most ardent
originalists seem to recognize that the Constitution was itself a rough
170
political compromise whose meanings were deeply contested. Nevertheless, many still cling to the view that the language brokering this
rough compromise should strictly bind judges. Many members of the
Founding generation, however, understood the Constitution's text
differently, insisting that its meanings would need to be “liquidated”
171
over the generations through “discussions and adjudications.” Similarly, national leaders during Reconstruction likened the Fourteenth
Amendment’s language to “a sign on a highway with different inscriptions on each side, so that people approaching the sign from oppo172
site directions necessarily read it differently.” This is not to say that
judges should never take constitutional text seriously, but, ironically,
the new originalists’ supreme elevation of the constitutional text over
all other interpretive factors may misunderstand the way the Founding and Reconstruction generations thought about constitutional
173
language.
Indeed, as Professor Nelson argues, the people who framed the
Fourteenth Amendment “were acting primarily as statesmen and po-

169
170
171

172
173

See Solum, supra note 17, at 115 (distinguishing “semantic meaning” from other sorts of
“meaning”).
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 66, at 861 (“[T]he Constitution . . . was a political compromise
that did not pretend to create a perfect society . . . .”).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 167, at 225 (discussing the Constitution as “more
or less obscure and equivocal, until [its] meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications” (emphasis omitted)); see also Mark R.
Killenbeck, Madison, M’Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cognizance: Some Thoughts on the
Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901, 914 (2003) (arguing that many of
the influential members of the Founding generation believed that the interpretation and
implementation of the Constitution “was ongoing and contextual”).
NELSON, supra note 136, at 143 (citing Charles Sumner’s views of the Amendment).
See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 136, at 8 (“Those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment
did not design it to provide judges with a determinative text for resolving . . . conflict[s]
in a narrow doctrinal fashion.”).
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174

litical leaders, not as legal draftsmen.” Their contemporaries, then,
likely understood the words not to offer legal guidance, but rather
political compromise, through the acceptance of extremely broad
principles. The new originalists might respond that words have semantic content regardless of the speakers’ intentions. Accepting arguendo this theory of language, we must still wrestle with the distinct
possibility that the reasonably informed citizen would have understood that the Fourteenth Amendment’s words would mean different
things to different people. On this view, the original public meaning
of many key phrases may have been under-determinate, even at the
time. Perhaps in a different context, these same words might have
communicated something more precise, but in the context of constitution-making following the Civil War, they did not. Phrased somewhat differently, if the reasonable observer in 1868 would have understood Section 1’s capacious language to offer not legal guidance
but a largely undefined political compromise, then attempts to interpret those words to mean something more precise may actually pervert the clause’s original public meaning. To be sure, the neworiginalist judge in this instance could conclude that the text is under-determinate and, therefore, turn to constitutional construction,
but given that much constitutional language from 1787 and 1868
embodied such rough political compromises, originalism under this
approach would not do much work.
Of course, even where the original public meaning is arguably
more determinate, there still remains the serious problem of figuring
out what the words mean. As Gordon S. Wood has written, “It may be
a necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a ‘correct’ or
‘true’ interpretation of the Constitution in order to carry on their
business, but we historians have different obligations and aims,” such
175
as identifying the Constitution’s contrasting meanings.
Perhaps
most historians (and, for that matter, law professors) do not under176
stand the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Grice, but any account of
constitutional meaning must rely upon historical evidence. If judges
do not sufficiently appreciate the nuances within the relevant texts
and the broader intellectual climate surrounding those texts, then
their account is likely to be tainted, no matter how sophisticated their

174
175
176

Id. at 143.
Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 628, 632–33
(1987).
See Solum, supra note 17, at 112–15 (examining a canonical history article that analyzes
Wittgensteinian and Gricean philosophies).
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philosophical theory. Fixation, in short, rests upon an objectivity that
is more often mythical than real.
C. Constraint Problems
The conclusion that it will often be difficult or impossible to ascertain the original semantic meaning is an indication that the new
originalism’s capacity to constrain is also limited. Of course, there
are some provisions for which the original public meaning is clear
177
In such cases, this meaning will often presumptively
and precise.
govern and, thus, constrain. But, these kinds of clauses are rarely the
provisions subject to litigation, so it is not clear that the new
originalism would constrain very much in actual cases. It is true, of
course, that the original public meaning of the term “domestic violence” in Article IV, Section 4 referred to riots and insurrections, rather than spousal abuse, and the new originalism intelligently reminds us that it is the original, rather than the contemporary,
178
meaning of the words that must govern. But, no informed observer
would interpret the Domestic Violence Clause to apply to spousal
abuse, so it is unclear that the new originalism actually adds con179
straints that did not already exist.
Instead, litigation that actually
turns on a provision’s original public meaning is more likely to involve provisions like the Second Amendment, about whose original
180
semantic meaning reasonable people can and do differ.
To their credit, many new originalists recognize that constitution181
al text cannot decide all cases. Indeed, it is precisely those cases in
which the constitutional text is under-determinate that judges must
182
turn from interpretation to construction.
In such instances, after
interpreting the text to find an under-determinate original semantic
177
178
179
180

181

182

See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95,
101 (2010) (discussing the phrase “domestic violence” in the Constitution).
See Colby, supra note 7, at 753 (arguing that new originalists’ constraint arguments do not
have any substance).
See supra notes 30–49 and accompanying text; cf. Solum, supra note 59, at 143, 145 (arguing that the fact that constitutional litigation involves issues in construction should not
obscure the fact that the constitutional text provides guidance in many cases that are never litigated).
See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69
(2011) (“The text of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does not say everything one
needs to know to resolve all possible cases and controversies.”); supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See Solum, supra note 17, at 69 (“It must be the case that meaning does run out before
providing sufficient content to determine the outcome of issues faced in constitutional
practice.”).
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meaning, the judge’s constitutional construction “must be guided by
183
something other than original meaning,” so that “other forms of
184
constitutional argumentation may be given relatively free rein.” As
Professor Barnett explains, “Unless there is something in the text that
favors one construction over the other, it is not originalism that is doing the work when one selects a theory of construction to employ
when original meaning runs out, but one’s underlying normative
185
commitments.”
This candid assessment concedes that at the construction stage,
the new originalism does not constrain judicial choices, except inso186
far as the constitutional construction must not violate the text.
Nevertheless, curiously, some originalists still maintain that this new
187
originalism does constrain in important ways. Judge Douglas Ginsburg goes so far as to argue that new originalism is more constraining
188
than earlier variants because it is “more objective.” Given that some
of semantic originalism’s most prominent advocates have explained
that judges may consult the full panoply of interpretive methodolo189
gies during the “construction” phase, it seems doubtful that at least
these iterations of the new originalism significantly constrain judicial
190
decision making. Nevertheless, as Judge Ginsburg’s comment indicates, the myth of constraint persists.
183
184
185
186

187

188
189
190

Solum, supra note 16, at 934.
Whittington, supra note 1, at 82.
Barnett, supra note 181, at 70.
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 645 (1999)
(arguing that constitutional interpretation must be distinguished from constitutional
construction, the latter of which should be used when meaning is under-determinate);
Solum, supra note 19, at 495 (arguing that “[c]onstruction is ubiquitous”).
See, e.g., Colby, supra note 7, at 750 (arguing that most new originalists still promise that
their methodology will constrain judicial decision making); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) (arguing that the new originalism
“requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing
less”).
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency and
Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 237 (2010).
See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
Admittedly, some new originalists offer variations that constrain judges more. For example, Gary Lawson contends that originalists can avoid constitutional construction by
adopting constitutional default rules, which would apply when the text’s meaning is uncertain. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2012) (“In
the event that there is any uncertainty about what this Constitution means in any specific
application, resolve the uncertainty against the existence of federal power and in favor of
the existence of state power.”); see also Solum, supra note 19, at 512–14 (discussing Lawson’s argument that constitutional interpretation can eliminate the need for constitutional construction by creating default rules). This approach would limit judicial discretion insofar as it would provide judges with instructions for resolving cases when
constitutional meaning runs out. At least one other scholar makes a related point. See
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Of course, this is not to argue that the new originalism does not
constrain at all. The new originalism does forbid constitutional constructions from violating the original semantic meaning of the consti191
tutional provision in question. However, in emphasizing constraint
192
as one of originalism’s selling points, originalists are implying that
their methodology constrains more successfully than alternative
methodologies. This implication is dubious. A judge who has already
found that the relevant provision is under-determinate enough to
trigger a move from interpretation to construction is unlikely to find
that same provision very constraining at the construction stage.
In reality, the new originalism, at the construction stage, is similar
to the status quo in constitutional interpretation, in that the judge is
given wide leeway. For instance, a judge could, consistent with new
originalism, decide that when the text’s semantic meaning runs out,
she will defer to the legislature or, alternatively, adopt a presumption
193
of liberty.
These approaches would be consistent with many variants of the new originalism but would yield opposite results in most
cases. To this extent, constitutional construction is potentially even
less constraining than common law constitutional interpretation
194
seeking to follow precedent, which most Justices do anyway.

191
192
193

194

Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 857, 878 (2009) (disputing that when the text is indeterminate, “an interpreter therefore has interpretive license to fill the gaps with whatever content the interpreter desires”). However, many other versions of new originalism do not build in such
constraining canons of construction. See BALKIN, supra note 5, at 3; Barnett, supra note
181, at 70; Solum, supra note 17, at 18–19.
In all events, the variety of new originalism theories creates a similar problem of malleability that was characteristic of the old originalism. See supra Part I.A. While this variety reflects the richness of the scholarly landscape, it also belies the notion that a universal
turn to this method of interpretation will place all judges on the same page. Of course,
this objection does not undermine the constraining capacity of any particular variant of
new originalism. Nevertheless, if constitutional theory is to constrain judges, it must get
them to agree on common ground, and the absence of such common ground, even
among self-described new originalists, suggests that it will be hard to agree on a universal
approach. In some instances, these theoretical differences may not yield significant practical differences, but in some instances, they certainly would. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note
181, at 70; infra note 193 and accompanying text.
See Solum, supra note 5, at 154 (noting that originalists believe that “original meaning
should have binding or constraining force”).
See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
See Barnett, supra note 181, at 70 (“So, just as originalists need a normative theory to explain why we today should adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution, they also
need a normative theory for how to construe a constitution when its meaning runs out.”).
But see Lawson, supra note 190, at 1234 (adopting such a presumption against the constitutionality of federal legislation).
See STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 44 (“The common law approach is what we actually do.”).
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Indeed, far from constraining judges, a turn to new originalism
could liberate judges from the shackles of current constitutional doctrine. Because the Constitution is short and vague, its text has been
195
less presumptively decisive than more prolix statutes. Constitutional text, in other words, has generally taken a back seat in constitu196
tional interpretation through the generations. Accordingly, a shift
to the new originalism, away from common-law interpretive practices,
would yield great legal uncertainty, as it would reopen long-accepted
precedents for reexamination on the grounds that those precedents
197
are inconsistent with original public meaning.
For example, we
have a complex body of free speech doctrine permitting certain
abridgements of expression, including, among others, incitements to
198
violence, fighting words, and child pornography. However, as noted above, the First Amendment’s language speaks in absolutes, stipulating that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
199
speech.” Some prominent thinkers, including Justice Hugo Black,
have insisted that the First Amendment’s “emphatic command” for200
bids any abridgement of speech, but a move in that direction today
201
would unsettle decades of precedent. (Such textual devotion would
also need to justify First Amendment prohibitions on executive
abridgements of speech, given that the text is directed solely at “Con195

196

197

198

199
200
201

See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget,
that it is a constitution we are expounding.”); STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 34–35 (explaining
that in our system, constitutional precedent representing “two centuries of experience
grappling with the fundamental issues” typically takes precedence over the Constitution’s
short text).
See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J.
1717, 1726 (2003) (“[Constitutional] text plays essentially no operative role in deciding
the most controversial constitutional questions (about discrimination, fundamental
rights, and freedom of expression, for example) . . . .”). In addition to the new
originalists, Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz has also recently emphasized the importance
of the Constitution’s text. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010).
See Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 78, 115 (exploring challenges of overturning precedent that does not conform with originalist interpretation).
See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 776 (1982) (“This special and compelling interest, and the particular vulnerability of children, afford the State the leeway to regulate
pornographic material, the promotion of which is harmful to children . . . .”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (allowing for abridgements of speech that incite “imminent lawless action”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942) (discussing classes of speech that can be restricted without offending First
Amendment speech rights).
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
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gress.”) Similarly, the complex body of Eleventh Amendment doctrine would be, at a minimum, revisited were the Court to adopt the
202
new originalism as its sole method of constitutional interpretation.
And, even decades of incorporation doctrine, under which most of
the Bill of Rights is applied against the states, would also be revisited,
as it is hardly clear that the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment disrupted the settled practice of applying those
203
rights only against the federal government. From this perspective,
the adoption of a constitutional methodology that reopens many
204
seemingly decided issues could hardly be less constraining.
If anything, because originalism, unlike some other constitutional methodologies, purports to lock in constitutional meaning forever, the
new originalism may invite justices to aggrandize their own power by
selecting a single (contestable) original meaning to displace settled
law and serve as binding precedent in all future cases.
Constitutional theories’ capacity to constrain, in short, cannot be
judged solely in a vacuum but must be weighed in light of the culture
of interpretation already accumulated. Of course, as Professor Solum
argues, originalists need not be committed to “irrational absolutism”
and could follow even non-originalist precedent if it would be too
205
disruptive not to do so.
This is an important and sensible concession rendering the new originalism more palatable in practice. How206
ever, given how much constitutional precedent is not originalist,
this concession also risks gutting the theory, except in rare cases in
207
which there is little relevant precedent, such as (arguably) Heller.
Given the great flexibility deliberately built into constitutional
construction, the only way in which the new originalism can meaningfully constrain judges is at the interpretation stage—that is, by arguing that constitutional text is determinate enough to settle many a
202
203

204

205
206
207

See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 139 (1949) (“In his contention that Section I was
intended and understood to impose Amendments I to VIII upon the states, the record of
history is overwhelmingly against [Justice Black].”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New
Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 365 (2009) (“Viewed through the lens of original public meaning, the historical case for incorporation is therefore problematic.”).
See Rakove, supra note 126, at 578 (noting that public meaning originalism “can be enormously liberating . . . because it allows courts to ignore well-grounded precedent in the
pursuit of a vision of original constitutional meaning”).
See Solum, supra note 59, at 143, 158–59.
See STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 34–35.
But see Solum, supra note 59, at 143, 159 (discussing the virtues of a “slow and steady advance” of originalist jurisprudence).
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208

case. But, that argument takes us full circle, back to the problem of
fixation and the reality that the constitutional provisions most likely
to end up in litigation are those that lack discernible, determinate
209
meaning.
Indeed, even determining which sources count as sufficiently contemporaneous to inform the “original semantic meaning”
is a difficult judgment call that offers judges great latitude. (Is ten
years before or after ratification sufficiently contemporaneous?
Twenty?) At best, these inquiries may point to a range of possible
210
meanings or eliminate some potential interpretations.
At the end
of the day, then, the new originalism, just like the old, fails to constrain judicial decision making any better than other methods of con211
stitutional interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The historian Rakove once observed that law professors and judges think like foxes rather than hedgehogs in that they dabble in his212
tory (and other disciplines) and then move on. Rakove, of course,
was referencing Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between two types
of intellectuals: the hedgehog, who knows one thing, and the fox,
213
who knows many. As Berlin put it,
there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent and articulate . . . and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often

208

209
210

211

212

213

See Colby, supra note 7, at 773 (“[S]ome originalists seek to avoid the consequences of the
New Originalism by insisting that the objective, original public meaning of the Constitution’s major rights clauses is much less abstract.”).
See supra Part II.B.
See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,
1093, 1093 n.729 (1995) (noting that a particular argument is interpretation “within the
legitimate range of interpretations of the Amendment on originalist grounds”); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 690 (1987) (“History sometimes reveals a range of ‘original understandings.’”).
See Tushnet, supra note 43, at 617 (“The new originalism, like the old, fails to deliver on
its claim about eliminating judicial subjectivity, judgment, and choice.”). Interestingly,
other countries seeking to constrain judges usually reject American-style originalism as a
viable option. See generally Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1,
2–4 (2009).
See Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191, 213 (1999)
(reviewing 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) and AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)) (discussing
Berlin’s metaphor of the hedgehog and the fox).
See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 1 (1966) (building on Archilochus’s observation).
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unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de fac214
to way.

Rakove’s point was that lawyers are fox-like in their capacity to hunt
for helpful theories and evidence, in their adventurous forays outside
their own disciplinary boundaries, and in their propensity, over the
course of their careers, to make an argument in one case entirely
contrary to an argument in another.
With due respect to Rakove, I would submit that we can also think
of many judges, lawyers, and even law professors as hedgehogs, rather
than foxes—and, for reasons Rakove might find convincing. Judges
and lawyers are, by training, advocates, and they are highly skilled at
215
marshaling evidence zealously in favor of a certain outcome. In this
regard, the advocate and advocate-turned judge (or law professor)
sometimes proceeds like a hedgehog, viewing evidence through a
216
single-minded lens to build a convincing case. All evidence bolsters
the central argument, whether presented in a lawyer’s brief, a judge’s
opinion, or a professor’s scholarly agenda.
In fairness, most judges do not have much choice. It may be true,
as the Reconstruction historian Eric Foner has written, that most historians would not say that there is a single, universally accepted original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment (or many other constitu217
tional provisions), but the judge often does not have the luxury of

214
215

216

217

Id.
See Timothy P. O’Neill, Law and “The Argumentative Theory,” 90 OR. L. REV. 837, 848 (2012)
(“When a judicial opinion—especially a U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion in a five-tofour case—is couched in completely unequivocal language, its message to the other side
is: ‘You’re wrong. And, by the way, you are stupid and perhaps dishonest, too.’”); Laura
E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46
UCLA L. REV. 75, 85 (1998) (“Repeated exposure to adversaries’ arguments, set up as
opposing poles, establish a habit of mind for judges who in turn write opinions as though
they present a preordained correct answer, which embraces by necessity only one position
or viewpoint.”).
Although there are great advantages in having accomplished lawyers ascend to the bench,
it is worth noting that some countries have lay judges or professional judges who have
never practiced as lawyers. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA 103–04 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that in some countries, high court judges will have
served their entire careers as judges and, never having practiced, “will see the law solely
from the judge’s point of view”); John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication
and Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 93–100 (2006) (discussing lay judges). Whatever their disadvantages, these judges may not be as prone to some lawyers’
professional biases. See Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1569, 1586–91 (2007) (arguing that lawyers are prone to distinctive professional biases).
See Eric Foner, The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Conversation with Eric
Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 425, 427 (2006) (“I don’t think any historian would say there was a single meaning that was universally accepted in the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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concluding that the law is unclear. To the extent that judges must
decide a constitutional case one way or another (at least when they
do not dispose of it on other grounds), they gain little from illustrating the maddening historical and linguistic complexities of a question.
Most judges, I believe, honestly and earnestly try to reach the
218
“right” outcome, but originalism often makes it harder, not easier,
for them to do so. If applied consistently, as a sole method of constitutional interpretation today, originalism of any stripe would reopen
countless areas of constitutional doctrine, creating great uncertainty
in the law. It, moreover, would force judges to place great weight on
a complex body of obscure evidence with which they have minimal
training, thus heightening the danger that the judge will make honest mistakes or take interpretive liberties. By contrast, the traditional
common-law approach to constitutional interpretation, for all its
flaws, presents judges with a generally accepted common ground and
219
a limited range of plausible answers.
Moreover, the historical evidence often does not clearly indicate a
correct semantic meaning, so it is misleading for judges to pretend
otherwise. Indeed, judicial opinions as a genre are not good vehicles
for careful historical or historically based linguistic analyses. This is
not just because judges lack the training to do history well (although
220
that is true), but also because judges’ and historians’ temperaments
and objectives differ. Whereas the historian can spend years researching a nuanced book that acknowledges the contradictions of
an era, the judge must justify, in less time and fewer words, why her
resolution of a case is “correct.” Historians can account for paradox
221
and tension; lawyers and judges must justify outcomes. This is not
to say that historians are more fair-minded than lawyers or judges;
218

219
220

221

Cf. Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 465, 530–32 (2013) (noting that there are many talented, earnest judges who
work to resolve constitutional issues in accordance with constitutional principles).
See Strauss, supra note 196, at 1729–31 (discussing the merits of the common law approach to constitutional interpretation).
See Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L.
REV. 479, 526 (2008) (“[J]udges are not trained in the methods of professional historians.”); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1588
(1997) (“[T]here is good historical evidence that jurists rarely make good historians . . . .”).
See Jack N. Rakove, Confessions of an Ambivalent Originalist, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1346, 1347
(2003) (“Unlike lawyers, we [historians] are not trained to speak with the voice of the advocate or the adversary. . . . The nuance, subtlety, and respect for ambiguity that we [historians] cherish and relish in our research cannot easily be translated into urgent political discussion.”).
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historians, too, build arguments shaped by their own biases.
The
difference, however, is that the historians’ end-product can—and
should—admit, and even highlight, paradox, whereas the judge’s
opinion must defend her holding against contrary views.
In fairness, judges applying other constitutional methodologies
can also find evidence and build arguments to justify a preferred out223
come. This is especially so in close cases where reasonable people
can disagree and where even the most fair-minded person may find it
224
difficult to eliminate normative bias from legal analysis.
Originalism, then, is hardly the only methodology that fails to constrain judicial decision making. Originalism is particularly worthy of
criticism, however, because of its pretense that it is different—that it
captures the Constitution’s singular meaning and that it uniquely
“fixes” that “correct” meaning and, thereby, constrains judges’ choices. In this regard, originalism creates an especially misleading illusion of certainty. It may be comforting to think that clear, original
meanings constrain judicial decision making, but in most real cases,
this is a false comfort. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed,
“[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
225
man.”

222
223

224

225

See CROSS, supra note 25, at 109 (citing various historians).
See Harrison, supra note 89, at 481 (“[Judges] will formulate the goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment differently, and come to different conclusions about the effects of legal
rules, or both.”).
See Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 818 (2013) (“However impartial they try to be, judges, as
human beings, cannot wholly divorce their own values from their rulings, especially in
close cases about which reasonable people can differ on the correct legal outcome.”);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 324, 34553 (1990) (arguing that judges cannot convincingly exclude
current values from their interpretations and that decisions often involve conformity to
contemporary circumstances and values).
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, Address at the dedication of a new hall at the
Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).

